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Abstract
U.S. hog production has become an industrialized process. New technology has caused the scale
of operations to increase, and the organizational form of hog farms to change. One of the new
organizational forms can be found in North Carolina and Colorado where vertical integration and/or
franchise-like production methods prevail. This type of production may not be possible or appealing
to some producers. Instead, they may be able to reap some of the beneﬁts of specialization by forming
strategic alliances. The purpose of the paper is to answer the question: is it possible to create the same
sort of control mechanisms in a production alliance that exist in a vertically integrated ﬁrm?
Production risk is potentially one of the greatest problems in an alliance. We represent production risk
with two measurements of performance—pig weight, and pig mortality. We ﬁnd that high mortality
has severe consequences for pig production. But, with appropriate rent allocation mechanisms, the
member who causes under-production will be forced to bear most of the consequences. © 2001
Elsevier Science Inc. All rights reserved.
1. Introduction
U.S. hog production is evolving organizationally because the technology lends itself to
large-scale production practices (Grimes & Rhodes, 1995; Lawrence, 1997). Boehlje and
Hurt (1996) characterize the industrialization process as a shift from commodity production
to the manufacture of food products, a shift from hog production as an art to a reproducible
scientiﬁc endeavor, a shift from small-scale lumpy processes to a systems approach with
sophisticated batch process technologies. Very large, vertically integrated hog farms found
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PII: S1096-7508(01)00052-0in North Carolina, Colorado, and elsewhere, take advantage of scientiﬁc production methods.
Vertically coordinated systems are more capable of identity preserving product characteris-
tics and of passing information through marketing channels than traditional spot markets.
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As hog production evolves small scale producers with limited ﬁnances are faced with a
dilemma—either leave the industry or become employees of vertically integrated ﬁrms.
Westgren (1994) identiﬁed another option for enhancing the competitiveness of produc-
ers—the formation of strategic alliances. A three-ﬁrm hog production alliance, designed to
take advantage of the science embodied in the new technology would seem to be a viable
alternative to the vertically integrated model. However, a major concern for producers is
how to share the rents from an alliance to ensure good performance from all members.
Game theoretic sharing rules may provide the necessary structure within an alliance to
accomplish the task.
The objectives of the paper are twofold: to compare outcomes for various rent sharing
mechanisms within an alliance under varying conditions, and also to explain the results. The
paper is organized as follows: section two discusses related research on alliances. Section
three characterizes the contractual nature of the alliance organizational form. Section four
gives a description of the simulation method used in the analysis. Section ﬁve discusses the
simulation model. Section six delineates the experiments. Section seven summarizes the data
and assumptions. The results of the simulations are presented in section eight, and the
conclusion follows.
2. Related literature
Cozzarin and Westgren (2000) demonstrate that production problems, and agency prob-
lems in three-site hog production could be more easily dealt with in a franchise (sometimes
called an “integrator”) rather than in an alliance.
2 The franchise has mechanisms to control
and mitigate agency problems, such as management replacement clauses, 30-day cancella-
tion clauses, and penalties for poor feed conversion. It was demonstrated that the ﬁnancial
burden placed on production stages causing underproduction was higher in a franchise than
in an alliance (Cozzarin & Westgren, 2000).
The resource-based theory of the ﬁrm (Mahoney, 1992; Mahoney & Pandian, 1992;
Conner, 1991) maintains that certain resources within a ﬁrm can lead to sustainable com-
petitive advantage because they are inimitable. Barney (1991) notes that resources earn
sustained rents if they are—valuable, rare, nonsubstitutable, and inimitable. Mahoney and
Pandian (1992) typify a ﬁrm’s ability to capture and maintain rents as due to distinctive
competences (which relate to resources). It is the organizational capital of an alliance that is
the most difﬁcult resource for a competitor to imitate (Westgren, 1994). It can be a
sustainable source of quasi-rents for the members. In terms of an agricultural production
alliance the contractual nature of the rent sharing mechanism is one of the key resources that
could earn and sustain rents. For this reason the rent sharing mechanism is in our view
paramount to a successful and long-lived alliance.
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An alliance is an important organizational form midway between complete vertical
integration and spot market transactions (Peterson & Wysocki, 1998). Members of the
alliance generally ﬁnance their own capital and equipment purchases for their production
stage. They can therefore increase the scale of their individual operations (through special-
ization) without having to amass huge sums of equity that would be required for a typical
vertically integrated hog farm. They are also able to retain most of their autonomy (they are
of course still bound by the contractual commitments that they have within the alliance).
Alliance contracts are proprietary, and little is known about the magnitude of differences in
these speciﬁcations and about their performance implications. In the absence of this empir-
ical information, employing models of hypothetical contracts may aid in future contractual
design.
Fisher
3 (1998), Kliebenstein and Lawrence (1995), and Koehler, Lazarus, and Buhr
(1996) provide the starting point for the contractual nature of the alliance. The rent-sharing
nature of the alliance form is based on cost of production sharing rules (Fisher). The three
alliance members are joint residual claimants—proﬁt is computed on the day pigs are sold,
and is divided according to a priori sharing rules. Speciﬁcally, facilities at each stage of
production are individually owned. Feed is purchased individually by each producer at each
stage of production. Replacement gilts are purchased rather than bred on farm. Revenues are
used to pay each member’s costs of production, and then the residual rent (proﬁt) is shared
based upon each ﬁrm’s relative cost per pig (based on a historical average). Proﬁts and/or
losses are shared jointly at the end of each period and the sharing rule for all three members
co-operating is based upon each ﬁrm’s relative cost of production per unit.
There are two game theoretic payoff structures, one is used for pig weights, and the other
is used when underproduction occurs. Weight monitoring of pigs (as they transfer from one
stage to the next) is assumed to be a sufﬁcient statistic for inferring management effort, and
ability. Members who do not supply pigs at the minimum weight receive compensation only
for their production costs for that particular batch (they receive no proﬁts). The second payoff
structure is used to punish a member who causes underproduction in the system because of
high pig mortality. The member responsible for low productivity or low pig weights
surrenders his share of the proﬁts to the others.
We will now discuss the weight payoff structure in detail. The pigs are weighed (as a
batch) at each transfer point. If the current batch of market pigs has met the contractual
weight speciﬁcations at each transfer point then total proﬁt is computed (stage three’s
revenues minus the sum of stage one, two and three’s costs), and then for simplicity we make
the assumption that it is split between the members based on the cost of production sharing
rules (i).
4 This is a version of the “split the difference” rule discussed by Sutton (1986).
5 If
the pigs transferred from stage one were underweight then stages two and three take one-half
each of stage one’s proﬁts (stage one receives no proﬁt). If pigs from stage two were
underweight upon the transfer to stage three, then stage one and stage three share stage two’s
proﬁt equally (stage two receives no proﬁt). Similarly, if pigs from stage three are under-
weight then stages one and two divide stage three’s proﬁts. If two members supply under-
weight pigs, then the third member gets 100% of the proﬁt. If all members are at fault the
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presented in Table 1.
The second game theoretic payoff structure is designed to penalize the production stage
that has low productivity (caused by high mortality). The proﬁt sharing rules (i) based on
capacity are the same as those used for monitoring pig weights (Table 1). Because of the
sequential nature of the production process some of the sharing rules are irrelevant. In other
words, stages two and three should not be punished for high mortality in stage one. Similarly,
stages one and three should not be punished for high mortality in stage two. Hence only
sharing rules (b), (c), and (d) are relevant from Table 1.
4. Simulation technique
System dynamics is a simulation method that has been used extensively to model
production processes (both batch and continuous), as well as ﬁnancial, and management
control processes within ﬁrms (Lyneis, 1980). There are three major components in a
dynamic system: state variables, control variables, and feedback loops. State variables that
are conserved (accumulated) represent a stock, while state variables that are not conserved
are indicators of some condition of the system at a given instant (dt). Control variables update
or change the state variables with the passage of each time step. Feedback loops can be of
two types: positive feedback loops reinforce the variable that causes a change in the state
variable, while negative feedback loops counteract the initial change in the state variable.
The interactions between positive and negative feedback loops can be complex because both
types can be nonlinear, and hence their interactions can cause nonlinear (possibly unex-
pected) results.
5. Model
A 300-sow high technology operation was modeled with 14-day, segregated early wean-
ing, split-sex, phase feeding and all-in/all-out production technologies. The rationale for
Table 1
Game theoretic sharing rules for mortality and weight monitoring
Case Sharing rules (i) Calculated
sharing rules
(a) S1, S2, S3 responsible (1, 2, 3) (0.25, 0.15, 0.60)
(b) S1 responsible; S2, S3 not responsible (0, 2  1⁄2  1, 3  1⁄2  1) (0, 0.275, 0.725)
(c) S2 responsible; S1, S3 not responsible (1  1⁄2  2,0 ,3  1⁄2  2) (0.325, 0, 0.675)
(d) S3 responsible; S1, S2 not responsible (1  1⁄2  3, 2  1⁄2  3, 0) (0.55, 0.45, 0)
(e) S1, S2 responsible; S3 not responsible (0, 0, 1) (0, 0, 1)
(f) S1, S3 responsible; S2 not responsible (0, 1, 0) (0, 1, 0)
(g) S2, S3 responsible; S1 not responsible (1, 0, 0) (1, 0, 0)
(h) S1, S2, S3 cooperate (1, 2, 3) (0.25, 0.15, 0.60)
S1  breeding, gestation, and farrowing, S2  nursery, S3  ﬁnishing.
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would make the system accessible to most small-scale hog producers.
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The breeding, gestation, and farrowing unit (S1) has a sow herd consisting of 329 pigs.
Sows become pregnant at a rate of 2.063 per day (this is an abstraction having a fraction of
pregnant sows, however, it is resolved because only integer values of hogs are marketed) and
then move on to the gestation unit (264 head capacity). The sows remain in the gestation unit
until it is time to farrow (for 115 days). On the 116
th day the sows move to the farrowing unit
where they are assumed to farrow immediately. The sows and piglets remain in the farrowing
unit for 14 days. Then the piglets move on to the nursery unit, and the sows return to the
breeding herd where they may be culled, die or return to estrus. The weaned pigs spend 56
days in the nursery (S2), and are then transferred to the ﬁnishing unit (S3), where they remain
for an additional 126 days. The output from the ﬁnishing unit is market pigs. Market pigs are
subject to a packer’s pricing grid (pigs are valued in terms of backfat and live weight and
penalties are imposed for underweight pigs and/or fat pigs) obtained from Lee (1994). The
weight submodel draws an initial mean weight for the stage one group of pigs (pigs move
through the system on a daily basis in groups—thus if we omit deaths for expository
purposes, 2.063 farrowings occur per day, and 9.27 piglets survive per litter, then 19.12 pigs
move from the farrowing unit to the nursery unit). In stage two a stochastic daily gain is
added to the stage one ﬁnal weight over the time interval spent in the nursery. The stage three
weights are computed in the same manner.
The model calculates the consumption and cost of ten feeding rations. Feed consumption
is a ﬁxed amount per day per animal, depending on whether it is part of the breeding stock,
a nursery pig, or a feeder pig. The breeding stock is fed a gestation diet year round; the only
exception is when sows farrow, in which case they are fed a lactation diet. Four diets are fed
to the market pigs in the nursery (segregated early weaning starter, transition starter, phase
II starter, and phase III starter). Four diets (of decreasing lysine content) are fed to the pigs
in the growing and ﬁnishing stage (grower 110, grower 100, ﬁnisher 90, and ﬁnisher 75). The
cost of production for feed has actual (historical) input prices for the two main ingredients—
soybean meal (48% protein), and corn. Replacement gilts are valued at $240 each.
7 Each
batch of pigs is tracked from one stage to the next so that costs (especially feed related costs)
can be properly allocated. The costs in each stage include: feed costs for each ration, a ﬁxed
labor charge per head, a building cost, and other costs (utilities, hauling, veterinary and
medicine, supplies, operating interest, and miscellaneous).
8
The model was simulated over the last complete pig cycle as identiﬁed by Kenyon and
Purcell (1996). The cycle was from November 1988 to November 1994. At the start of the
cycle in November 1988, the price for market hogs was $36.33/cwt; the peak of the cycle (in
terms of price) was attained in May, 1990 at $62.59/cwt. The end point of the cycle was
reached in November 1994 with a price of $28.17/cwt.
6. Experiments
The simulation experiments in the paper take contractual design and the behavior of the
agents as exogenous.
9 Alliance members are assumed to cooperate with each other by
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rates in a particular production stage. Barring an increase in mortality, the outcome or total
surplus will be the same in each experiment. What will differ is the way in which the surplus
is divided among the members.
Two types of experiments were conducted: full capacity, and undercapacity. The two full
capacity experiments were done to give baseline returns for each organizational form. The
undercapacity experiments were designed to simulate the effects of one stage (with poor
management ability) that causes low productivity (viz., high mortality). Different experi-
ments examine the potential for inﬂicting ﬁnancial penalties on the member responsible for
low quality (low pig weights) and low productivity (underproduction due to high mortality).
In experiments 1 and 2, the simulation models operate at full capacity. The ﬁrst (baseline)
experiment does not have penalties for underweight pigs. The second experiment has game
theoretic sharing rules for monitoring the weights of pigs leaving each stage of production.
Additional experiments were conducted in which an alliance member causes undercapac-
ity in the system. Experiments 3 to 8, have a proﬁt sharing rule designed to punish the party
that underproduces but no penalties (bonuses) for under- or overweight pigs. If biological
data were obtainable, it would be possible to add the extra costs necessary to bring a group
of underweight weaned pigs to 60 lbs. during their 56-day stay in the nursery. According to
Vinson
10 (1997) such biological data do not exist, so the extra costs could not be included
in the model.
In Experiment 3, S1 may have high mortality, but no penalties are imposed. Low
productivity was modeled by increasing mortality in the farrowing unit (the same result could
have been obtained by having a stochastic farrowing rate). The death rate was modeled as a
uniform density with 1% as the minimum and 45% as the maximum. On average the number
of pigs marketed over the 6-year period of the contract is 30,300.
11
In Experiment 4, if S1 is undercapacity, and total proﬁt is positive, then S1’s share of the
proﬁt falls to zero (sharing rule (a) in Table 1), otherwise if there are losses, S1 must share
in them (sharing rule (d)). In Experiment 5, S2 causes undercapacity by having a stochastic
death rate in the nursery (uniform density, bounded by a minimum 2.5% death loss and a
maximum 45.66% death loss resulting in an average of 30,300 pigs marketed over the 6-year
period).
12 There is no penalty for being undercapacity, and there is no monitoring of pig
weights. Experiment 6 is the same as Experiment 5, except that when S2 is undercapacity and
total proﬁt is positive then S2’s share of the proﬁt is zero (sharing rule (b)), otherwise S2
must share in the alliance’s losses (sharing rule (d)). In Experiment 7, S3 may produce below
capacity by having a stochastic death rate in the ﬁnishing barn (uniform density, bounded by
a minimum of 4% death loss and a maximum of 47.12% death loss resulting in an average
of 30,300 pigs marketed over a 6-year period). There is no penalty for undercapacity nor is
there monitoring of pig weights. Experiment 8, is the same as Experiment 7, except that when
S3 is undercapacity and total proﬁt is positive then S3’s share of the proﬁt is zero (sharing
rule (c)), otherwise S3 must share in the alliance’s losses (sharing rule (d)).
Until this point, the experiments have used only one game theoretic structure at a time. In
experiments 9 to 14 the weight and capacity payoff structures are combined. The added
complication of two bonus-penalty schemes requires that proﬁts must be split in some
manner between them. In Experiment 9, S1 may be undercapacity (high mortality). Pigs
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(using the earlier penalty structure for underweight pigs), and there are penalties for
underproduction. Total proﬁt is split between two proﬁt pools. The ﬁrst proﬁt pool uses
sharing rules to distribute proﬁt based on capacity performance. The sharing rule between
alliance members when S1 is undercapacity is the same as before: when S1 is undercapacity
and proﬁts are positive then S1 receives zero proﬁt from the capacity performance pool, and
S2 and S3 share proﬁts via sharing rule (a), otherwise, if proﬁts are negative then sharing rule
(d) comes into effect. The second proﬁt pool distributes proﬁt based on weight performance.
Initially, we assume that proﬁt is split with 75% going into the proﬁt pool for capacity
performance and 25% going into the proﬁt pool for weight performance. Experiment 10, is
the same as Experiment 9 except the proﬁt is split with 25% going into the capacity pool and
75% into the weight performance pool. Experiments 11 and 12 are the same as experiments
9 and 10 in terms of proﬁt distribution, however, S2 experiences high mortality instead of S1.
Experiments 12 and 13, again are the same as experiments 9 and 10 with respect to proﬁt
distribution, except S3 is responsible for high mortality. The experiments are summarized in
Table 2.
7. Data and assumptions
The hog price used for the analysis was the Omaha terminal market cash price $/cwt. The
corn price was the East-Central Illinois cash price for #2 Yellow $/bushel. The soybean meal
price was the Decatur Illinois cash price with 48% protein on the rail in $/ton. Daily price
data were obtained from the Ofﬁce for Futures and Options research. The data covered the
period from 4 January, 1988 to 30 November, 1994 and were averaged to form a monthly
time series. The production cost model by Vinson (1994, 1997) was the basis for computing
dynamic production costs for each stage of production.
13 The mean weaned pig weight was
10 lbs. (normally distributed with standard deviation of 2 lbs.). The feeder pigs exiting from
S2 had a mean weight of 60 lbs. (normally distributed with standard deviation of 8.3 lbs.).
The ﬁnished pigs were sold at 196 days of age with a mean market weight of 250 lbs.
(normally distributed with standard deviation of 17.9 lbs.).
14 The 300-sow system under
normal conditions has 753 litters per year, which translates into 6,230 pigs marketed per year.
In terms of weekly sales, 119 pigs are sold per week.
15
8. Results
The results from the simulations are reported in three tables. Table 3 summarizes the ﬁrst
two full capacity experiments. Table 4 summarizes the six experiments that have penalties
for underproduction. The six experiments that include two proﬁt sharing schemes, one for
high pig mortality, and one for low pig weights are exhibited in Table 5.
It is evident from Table 3, Experiment 2, that proﬁt is redistributed from S1 and S2 to S3
when the rent-sharing scheme includes a weight bonus. Table 4 demonstrates the effective-
ness of the capacity penalty. In experiments 3 and 4, S1 experiences high pig mortality. With
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3. In experiments 5 and 6, S2 experiences high mortality and proﬁt declines by 93%. With
the capacity penalty, S2 loses 163% of its proﬁt relative to the baseline, while S1 and S3’s
losses are reduced from 93% each, to 72% and 84% respectively. In experiments 7 and 8, S3
has high mortality. S3 loses 171% proﬁt relative to the baseline with the capacity penalty,
while S1 and S2’s losses are reduced from 125% each, to 70% and 33% respectively.
The last six experiments, shown in Table 5 incorporate penalties for both mortality and
low weight gain into the rent sharing mechanism. If Experiment 9 is compared to Experiment
4, the addition of a weight bonus/penalty redistributes proﬁt from S2 and S3 to S1. In
Experiment 10, when a higher proportion of proﬁt is devoted to the weight monitoring
mechanism, even more proﬁt is redistributed to S1. In Experiment 11, S2 is the cause of










1 No Full No Cost of production for S1, S2, and S3 paid out of total
revenue. Remainder is proﬁt (allocated based on sharing
rules).
2 Yes Full No Same as exp 1.
Under-capacity experiments
3 No S1 Below No Cost of production for S1, S2, and S3 paid out of total
revenue. Remainder is proﬁt (allocated based on sharing
rules).
4 No S1 Below Yes Same as exp 3, except when S1 is below capacity and total
proﬁt is positive then S1’s proﬁt is zero, else S1 pays its
share of losses.
5 No S2 Below No Same as exp 3.
6 No S2 Below Yes Same as exp 3, except when S2 is below capacity and total
proﬁt is positive then S2’s proﬁt is zero, else S2 pays its
share of losses.
7 No S3 Below No Same as exp 3.
8 No S3 Below Yes Same as exp 3, except when S3 is below capacity and total
proﬁt is positive then S3’s proﬁt is zero, else S3 pays its
share of losses.
9 Yes S1 Below Yes When S1 is below capacity and total proﬁt is positive, then
S1’s proﬁt is zero, else if proﬁts are negative, S1 pays
lambda as a proportion of losses. 75% proﬁt to capacity
pool, 25% to weight pool.
10 Yes S1 Below Yes Same as exp 9, but 25% proﬁt to capacity pool, 75% to
weight pool.
11 Yes S2 Below Yes Same as exp 9.
12 Yes S2 Below Yes Same as exp 10.
13 Yes S3 Below Yes Same as exp 9.
14 Yes S3 Below Yes Same as exp 10.
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a capacity penalty), while S3 receives more proﬁt than in Experiment 6. So, in experiments
11 and 12, S1 loses relatively more proﬁt than S3. In experiments 13 and 14, S2 loses
relatively more proﬁt relative to S1 when compared to Experiment 8. It is evident that the
weight mechanism redistributes proﬁt away from the alliance member who causes under-
production.
9. Conclusion
Production risk is an important potential difﬁculty within an alliance. In this paper, we
represented production risk with two measurable variables—pig weight, and pig mortality.
It is clear that high mortality has severe consequences for pig production. Not only does total
proﬁt decrease but risk sharing varies signiﬁcantly depending upon the internal structure of
the alliance. The results show ﬁrstly, that capacity problems are more serious the further we
move downstream, secondly, that with a capacity penalty the offending member will be
punished for high mortality. Thirdly, the results indicate that with the additional complication
of a weight monitoring mechanism coupled with a capacity penalty, it would be better to put
a smaller proportion of total proﬁts into the weight proﬁt pool than into the capacity penalty
pool. This would ensure that the member who causes underproduction will bear most of
consequences.
Resource-based theory can help in interpreting the results of the simulation experiments.
The joint resource portfolio of the alliance members must be superadditive relative to
portfolios that are individually held otherwise there is no incentive to form an alliance. In
order for the portfolio to possess superadditivity, it will undoubtedly require a complemen-
tary mix of the members’ organizational and human resources. The rents from the alliance
represent returns to human and organizational capital, which is central to the capacity of the
alliance to earn and sustain rents. The unique combination of resources within the alliance
is critical to its survival. If one of the three members does not possess the necessary skills
and abilities the sharing of the rent stream should reﬂect that.
Table 3
Full capacity experiments (six-year simulation)
Payment
mechanism
Mean payment ($/head) Proﬁt ($) Total
proﬁt S1 S2 S3 S1 S2 S3
Exp 1 (base) Proﬁt share 28.38 17.11 61.29 94,986 56,992 227,966 379,944
0.15* 0.15 0.18 82.27** 49.36 197.44
Exp 2 Proﬁt share 
weight bonus
27.85 16.97 62.01 72,841 51,541 255,562 379,944
0.25 0.39 0.19 134.29 124.32 209.53
Change from base 2% 1% 1% 23% 10% 12% 0%
* Coefﬁcient of variation for payment.
** Standard deviation for proﬁt.
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Mean payment ($/head) Proﬁt ($) Total
proﬁt
S1 S2 S3 S1 S2 S3
Exp 3 Proﬁt share S1 28.45 17.14 60.55 56,575 33,945 135,781 226,301
0.16* 0.17 0.21 78.05** 46.83 187.31
Change from base 0% 0% 1% 40% 40% 40% 40%
Exp 4 Proﬁt share 
capacity
penalty
S1 25.85 18.47 61.94 34,021 79,244 181,079 226,302
0.10 0.24 0.23 37.89 73.78 213.44
Change from base 9% 8% 1% 136% 39% 21% 40%
Exp 5 Proﬁt share S2 26.06 16.17 56.51 6,964 4,178 16,713 27,855
0.15 0.18 0.22 76.34 45.81 183.22
Change from base 8% 5% 8% 93% 93% 93% 93%
Exp 6 Proﬁt share 
capacity
penalty
S2 26.55 15.01 57.11 27,050 35,993 36,799 27,856
0.17 0.11 0.23 89.75 24.40 196.47
Change from base 6% 12% 7% 72% 163% 84% 93%
Exp 7 Proﬁt share S3 25.31 15.29 54.03 24,051 14,431 57,723 96,205
0.15 0.15 0.23 74.08 44.45 177.78
Change from base 11% 11% 12% 125% 125% 125% 125%
Exp 8 Proﬁt share 
capacity
penalty
S3 26.58 16.59 50.78 28,536 38,157 162,898 96,205
0.22 0.27 0.18 112.56 84.49 126.18
Change from base 6% 3% 17% 70% 33% 171% 125%
* Coefﬁcient of variation. ** Standard deviation.


































































































Mean payment ($/head) Proﬁt ($) Total
proﬁt
S1 S2 S3 S1 S2 S3
Exp 9 Proﬁt share  wt
bonus  capacity
penalty
S1 26.29 18.04 61.92 17,190 65,773 177,719 226,302
0.13* 0.26 0.21 53.17** 75.84 202.00
Change from base 7% 5% 1% 118% 15% 22% 40%
Exp 10 Proﬁt share  wt
bonus  capacity
penalty
S1 27.18 17.19 61.87 16,472 38,833 170,998 226,303
0.24 0.37 0.20 101.11 97.99 192.17
Change from base 4% 0% 1% 83% 32% 25% 40%
Exp 11 Proﬁt share  wt
bonus  capacity
penalty
S2 26.25 15.00 57.53 14,748 33,903 47,010 27,855
0.18 0.20 0.21 91.73 42.67 185.22
Change from base 8% 12% 6% 84% 159% 79% 93%
Exp 12 Proﬁt share  wt
bonus  capacity
penalty
S2 25.66 14.99 58.37 9,855 29,723 67,434 27,856
0.23 0.43 0.20 111.37 90.72 175.08
Change from base 10% 12% 5% 110% 152% 70% 93%
Exp 13 Proﬁt share  wt
bonus  capacity
penalty
S3 26.05 15.97 52.36 6,356 13,065 115,625 96,204
0.21 0.28 0.17 107.32 84.19 124.68
Change from base 8% 7% 15% 93% 77% 151% 125%
Exp 14 Proﬁt share  wt
bonus  capacity
penalty
S3 24.98 14.73 55.52 38,006 37,118 21,080 96,204
0.24 0.38 0.18 116.13 105.41 147.34
Change from base 12% 14% 9% 140% 165% 109% 125%
* Coefﬁcient of variation. ** Standard deviation.



























































































2The rent sharing structure in this paper rewards organizational and human capital, by
monitoring performance of alliance members and removing rents from those who do not
perform to a minimum standard. The proposed rent-sharing structure may also act as a
screening device so that prospective alliance members will self-identify. This is similar to the
problem of mechanism design where insurers design contracts with speciﬁc coverage,
indemnity, premiums, and deductibles that ensure that high-risk agents will choose the
proper insurance plan. Measures of organizational and human capital are imperfect. Educa-
tion is usually a signal of a high quality individual, however, that is not always the case.
16
Measures of organizational capital are historical in nature (observation of past performance
while functioning in a similar role; reputation effects are another indicator). By having an a
priori mechanism that punishes poor performance within the alliance, those with low
organizational and human capital will self-identify by not agreeing to sign a contract with
such mechanisms in place.
Notes
1. Schrader and Boehlje (1996) and Koehler, Lazarus, and Buhr (1996) identify seven
more reasons for forming alliances: access to technology, market access, increased
quality, information sharing, risk reduction, efﬁciency, and the ability to increase
off-farm work.
2. Usually the stage one (breeding-gestation-farrowing) owner is called an “integrator.”
Stage two (nursery) and stage three (ﬁnishing) is often contracted out to other
producers. It is accurate to call the owner a franchisor. As an organizational form a
franchise is one step removed from complete vertical integration. See for example
Cozzarin and Barry (1998).
3. Gary Fisher is President of AgAnalysis, a farm management ﬁrm based in Perth,
Ontario. He was the only consultant (that we spoke to) who would discuss the
ﬁnancial and organizational structure of a functioning swine alliance.
4. The sharing rules are based on costs of production computed with the Vinson model
using the one year average corn price (average daily price from 21 February, 1996 to
21 February, 1997 was $3.66/bushel) and soybean meal price (average daily price
from 21 February, 1996 to 21 February, 1997 was $239.84/ton).
5. We assume that animals will be weighed and counted upon exiting each stage. This
assumption results in a complete and symmetric information set that is known to all
the players. A symmetric information set means that no player has information
different from the others when he moves, while a complete information set is one
where nature does not move ﬁrst or that nature’s initial move is observed by all the
players. Other sharing rules could be devised depending on assumptions about the
player’s information sets (asymmetric and/or incomplete) and whether we want to
consider mixed strategy equilibria or pure strategy equilibria. The solution to such
games is the realm of noncooperative bargaining theory, which will not be discussed
here.
6. A reviewer pointed out that 1200 or 2400 sow operations are now the industry norm.
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is a matter of scaling, the sharing rules would result in the same distribution of proﬁts
and losses.
7. We are assuming that replacement gilts are purchased from an external supplier of
high quality genetic lines such as DeKalb. We could not ﬁnd enough data to ﬁta
distribution, so a deterministic price was used instead.
8. See Cozzarin (1998) p. 149 for an example.
9. We chose to run the simulations through a typical hog cycle running from 1988 to
1994. The choice of time period is not critical for the analysis since our only purpose
is to compare how rents are allocated between different organizational forms.
10. Dr. Ralph Vinson DVM, is a swine management consultant located in Oneida,
Illinois. The College of Veterinary Medicine at the University of Illinois recom-
mended him.
11. We could not obtain industry data that documented possible death losses (due to
disease) at each production stage. As such, a uniform density was assumed. The death
rates differ slightly for the different stages in order to keep total production (30,300)
the same for each experiment.
12. See footnote 9.
13. The data from Vinson agrees for the most part with Boehlje et al. (1995).
14. The original carcass weight adjustments were for warm carcass weights. These were
converted to live weight by dividing the mean hot carcass weight by the mean
slaughter weight (from Lee) to obtain 0.74. The bonus for low backfat ranges from
$1.00 to a maximum of $7.00 and the penalty for high backfat ranges from -$1.00 to
-$7.25. There is no bonus for backfat less than 1.2 inches with a pig weighing less
than 218 lbs. The backfat premium is added to the market price received for the hog
in $/cwt.
15. 2.063 litters are born per day. The calculation is based on the following: 329 sows
times 2.29 farrowings/sow/year  753 litters/year, divided by 365 days to obtain
2.063 litters born per day. Summing the time spent in S1, S2, and S3, it takes 311 days
until the ﬁrst group of pigs is marketed. Sales occur on a daily basis (a simpliﬁcation).
It takes 310 days for the model to reach full production. Since the concern is with the
full productive capacity of the system, the time span from Day 1 to Day 310 is not
included in the proﬁt calculations.
16. Sometimes low and high quality individuals choose different education levels to
signal their quality. This results in a separating equilibrium. While in other cases, low
and high quality agents choose the same education level resulting in a pooling
equilibrium (Spence, 1974).
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